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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD CAUBLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14433 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County upon an information alleging a violation 
of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404, in that he 
"exercised unauthorized control over cash in excess of $1,000 
belonging to Western Leisure Industries with intent to deprive 
the said Western Leisure Industries thereof.n 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 
serve not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. It is from that verdict and judgement that the 
Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction or failing 
that, a new trial. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In November 1974, the defendant worked for a company 
known as Western Leisure Industries as General Manager of their 
Payson plant (T 94, 126). The authority of the defendant in that 
position included picking up checks on trailers sold to dealers 
(T 26, 183),delivery of checks to the comptrollers office in Salt , 
Lake City (T 56, 173, 174, 183) and deposit of checks (T 112, 132). 
On November 13, 1974, the defendant received a cashiers check in 
the amount of $9,262 from one Boyd Wheelwright representing payment 
for trailers purchased by Mr. Wheelwright from Western Leisure 
Industries (T 49). Defendant took the check to Salt Lake City, where 
instead of delivering the check to the comptroller, Mr. Giles, he 
opened a new account for the Mansford Corporation, a corporation 
wholly owned by defendant, at the Sugarhouse branch of Tracy-Collins 
Bank and Trust Company, Salt Lake City. The defendant received cash 
in the amount of $262, a cashiers check in the amount of $4,917.66 
made payable to Blazon Corporation, and the balance wag deposited 
to the Mansford account (T 74). The Blazon Corporation was the 
sole stockholder of Western Leisure Industries. The Blazon check 
was delivered to the comptroller, Mr. Giles, in Salt Lake City 
and was given a promissory note by Mr. Giles in the amount of the 
check (T 28, 29). At the close of the State's case, the defense 
counsel moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the 
State had failed to prove that the offense occurred within Utah 
County (T 86). The Court denied the motion pro forma (T 87). 
Defendant testified on direct examination that he 
deposited the funds to cover a claim he had against Western 
Leisure Industries for wages, expenses and car allowance amounting 
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to between $9,500 and $10,000 (T 97). Defendant discussed his 
claim against the company with Mr. Giles and with a Mr. Boyd 
Saderup, the President of Western Leisure Industries and Blazon, 
Inc., prior to offsetting the claim against receivables (T 109-110) 
as well as subsequent thereto (T 115-116). 
Upon cross examination of the defendant, the prosecutor 
asked the following: 
Q. Mr. Gauble, I believe you testified that during 
the course of your direct testimony, that you 
did not offset any accounts receivable from 
the company, other than the check involved in 
this transaction? 
A. That fs correct. 
Q. And that is the Wheelwright transaction? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you ever collect checks from anybody for 
the sale of trailers or any other materials 
from Western Leisure Industries that you 
kept the money on? (T 148) 
Subsequent to that series of questions, the prosecutor 
asked about a specific instance where the defendant had deposited 
a check from Jordan Nurseries in Salt Lake City made payable to 
Western Leisure Industries dated August 21, 1974, to his Mansford 
Inc. account in the Bank of Salt Lake (T 149, 151, 161, 162). The 
prosecutor then further questioned the defendant concerning a check 
dated October 1974 from Dixon, Inc., of Reno, Nevada made payable 
to the Mansford Corporation (T 152-156). Counsel for defendant 
objected to the admission of a proposed Exhibit 40 (a letter 
concerning the Dixon, Inc., traisaction) as being immaterial 
and further objected to the entire line of questioning of the 
prosecutor as being beyond the scope of direct examination (T 159). 
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The Court upheld the objection as to the admissibility of the 
Exhibit 40, but allowed the prosecutor to proceed with his same 
line of questioning (T 160). The prosecutor then proceeded to 
question the defendant about the Dixon, Inc., check, the Jordan 
Nursery check and an additional check from a Roberta Swenson 
(Exhibit 37)(T 159-167). 
The prosecutor then offered plaintifffs Exhibits 34, 
35, 36 and 37 (these exhibits were checks and deposit slips 
regarding the foregoing transactions) to which the defense counsel 
objected upon the grounds that the exhibits were not material and 
further moved once again that the line of testimony concerning 
the exhibits was inadmissible and immaterial and requested that it 
all be stricken (T 167). The Court overruled defense counselfs 
objection to the admission of exhibits and overruled defense counsel's 
motion to strike (T 167). The prosecutor then recalled Mr. David 
Giles, the comptroller, for Western Leisure Industries who testified 
concerning the Dixon, Inc., transaction (T 185). The prosecution 
then offered Exhibits 38 and 40 (Exhibit 38 was a check stub and 
Exhibit 40 was a letter relating to the Dixon, Inc., transaction) 
to which defense counsel objected as being immaterial (T 186). The 
Court overruled the objection and received Exhibits 38 and 40 (T 186). 
The prosecutor then questioned Mr. Giles further 
concerning the Dixon, Inc., transaction and offered Exhibit 39, a 
copy of the check of Dixon, Inc., to Mansford, Inc., in the amount 
of $1,000. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the 
exhibit on the grounds that it was not material. The Court again 
overruled defense counsel's objection and received Exhibit 39 
(T 188-189). 
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During the State's summation, the prosecutor spent 
a substantial portion of his time, pointing out to the Jury the 
transactions which occurred prior to the 14th of November, 1974. 
The prosecutor challenged the credibility of the defendant, by 
using the testimony and exhibits relating to the prior transactions 
(T 199-203). 
The Jury returned the verdict guilty as charged. After 
the verdict was entered, defense counsel renewed his motion for 
a directed verdict and the Court allowed defense counsel to submit 
a brief in support thereof (T 216), the Court later denied the 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT WAS TRIED IN UTAH COUNTY IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE CRIME 
OCCURRED. 
The Utah State Constitution grants the defendant the 
right to be tried in the county in which the crime was alleged 
to have been committed through Article I, Section 12, which 
provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusations 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted by witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory processes to 
compel attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed. (Emphasis added) 
In addition to Article I, Section 12, Article VIII, 
Section 5 provides in part: 
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All civil and criminal business arising in any 
county, must be tried in such county, unless 
a change of venue be taken, in such cases as 
may be provided by law. 
Both of the foregoing constitutional provisions clearly 
provide for trial in the county in which the crime is committed. 
However, Utah Annotated Section 76-1-202 (iii) provides for trial 
in any county in which the defendant exerts control over the 
property: 
A person who commits theft may be tried in any 
county in which he exerts control over the 
property affected. 
This statute is unconstitutional in that it modifies 
the right to trial in the county in which the crime was committed 
as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 and Article VIII, Section 
5 of the Utah State Constitution. The language of Utah Code 
Annotated 76-6-202 (iii) clearly allows trial in a county in 
which none of the elements of the crime occurred, by the use 
of the term "control". The statute which the defendant is charged 
with violating is Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404, which provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
The two critical elements of the crime are obtaining 
or exercising unauthorized control of property of another and with 
a purpose to deprive. In the present case, there was no evidence 
of any unauthorized control over the property (cash) in Utah 
County. The defendant had authority to exercise control over 
the property in Utah County and take the property to Salt Lake 
County. 
-6-
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In considering a former Utah State statute which 
provided that trial may be had in either of two counties where 
part of the crime was committed in one county and part in another, 
the Court stated: 
Before that section can become operative in any 
criminal case, one of two things must appear: 
Either, first, the offense must be divisible, 
and each part be unlawful in and of itself, and 
committed at a different time and place; or 
second, the offense must consist of more than 
one act, each of which acts, or effect of such 
acts, must constitute an unlawful element of 
the offense, without the presence of which the 
offense could not be consummated. The mere 
existence in some other county than the place 
of trial of acts or conditions of the defendant 
lawful in and of themselves, but necessary to 
be alleged and proven in order to establish the 
crime charged, does not invoke the power of 
this statute, so as to permit the trial of the 
defendant in some other county. State v Graham, 
23 Utah 278, 64 P 557, 559. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101 requires the union of 
act and intent before a defendant is culpable. In this case, 
there must have been an unauthorized control over property 
and an intent to permanently deprive before the crime is culpable. 
Since the unauthorized control did not occur, if at all, until the 
defendant disposited the check in Salt Lake County the following 
day, the crime was not committed in Utah County. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with the provision of 
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah State Constitution in State v 
Cox, 106 Utah 853, 147 P 2d 858 (1944) where the Court ruled that 
a defendant must be tried in the County in which the crime was 
committed. 
The court of other states have found provisions which 
allowed the prosecution of offenses in counties other than the county 
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wherein the crime was committed unconstitutional. In an 
annotation in 76 A.L.R. 1034, Constitutionality of Statute for 
Prosecution of Offense in County, Other than That in which it was 
Committed, Section 2, at 1036 it is stated: 
But where the Constitution of the State guarantees 
to an accused a trial by an impartial jury of the 
county in which the offense has been committed, it 
has generally been held that a statute giving 
jurisdiction of a prosecution to the courts of a 
county other than that in which the offense has 
been committed is void as denying to the offender 
the constitutional right of trial in his county 
of vicinage. Walls v State (1877) 32 Ark. 565; 
Dempsey v State (1894) 94 Ga. 766, 22 S.E. 57; 
State v Moore (1916) 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965; 
Ex parte Slater (1880) 72 Mo. 102; State v McGraw 
(1885) 87 Mo. 161; State v Hatch (1887) 91 Mo. 568, 
4 S.W. 502; State v Smiley (1889) 98 Mo. 605; 
12 S.W. 247; State v Mispagel (1907) 207 Mo. 557, 
106 S.W. 513; State v Carroll (1909) 55 Wash. 588, 
133 Am. St. Rep. 1047, 104 Pac. 814, 19 Ann. Cas. 
1234; State v Reese (1920) 112 Wash. 507, 11 A.L.R. 
1018, 192 Pac. 934. 
In State v Carroll, 55 Wash. 588, 104 Pac. 814, cited 
in the foregoing annotation, a statute providing for trial of a 
theft offense in either the county of the theft or the county where 
the property was found to be unconstitutional. Also, in Addison v 
State, 199 Kan. 554, 431 P. 2d 532 (1967), the Kansas Supreme Court 
stated that where the statute is subject to constitutional restriction, 
the construction of the statute must be within such constitutional 
boundaries or else the statute is void. The court in Addison, supra 
dealt with a constitutional provision which accorded defendants the 
same right to a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense was alleged to have been 
committed11 as does Article I, section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. 
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As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v Betensen, 
14 U. 2d 121, 378 P 2d 669 (1963), it is fundamental that a statute 
which contravenes a constitutional provision is void. 
Therefore, since 76-1-202 (iii) permits prosecution 
for an offense in a county other than the county in which the crime 
was committed, the constitutional right of the defendant to be 
tried by a jury in the county wherein the offense was committed 
has been violated and his conviction snould be reversed. 
POINT II. THE STA1E FAILED TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIME CHARGED. 
Defendant was charged in the information with a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404 in that "on the 13th 
day of November, 1974, at Utah County, State of Utah, said 
Richard Mansford Cauble exercised unauthorized control over cash 
in excess of $1,000 belonging to Western Leisure Industries with 
the intent to deprive the said Western Leisure Industries thereof11. 
The testimony of both the State!s witnesses and that 
of the defendant clearly established that no unauthorized control 
of cash or any other property took place in Utah County. The 
testimony of Mr. Giles, Mr. Saderup and the appellant was that 
defendant had the authority to pick up checks and take them to 
Salt Lake City to Mr. Giles. Therefore, the defendant could not 
have exercised unauthorized control in Utah County. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101 requires both unlawful 
conduct and intent or a union of act and intent. In the present 
case there was no unlawful conduct in Utah County. The alleged 
unlawful conduct did not occur until the following day, November 
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14, 1974, in Salt Lake County when he took the check to the 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company and deposited it for his 
benefit. 
Therefore, the trial court should have granted defense 
counsel's Motion for Directed Verdict. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED BY THE 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS AND TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE COMMISSION OF 
OTHER CRIMES OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN CONVICTED. 
Defendant was questioned concerning whether or not he 
had taken money on other occasions (T 148). Defendant replied no. 
(T 148) The prosecution then proceeded to inquire of defendant 
concerning certain specific instances when he had allegedly taken 
money without authorization. (T 151-167) 
These alleged acts were of such a nature as to 
constitute the crime of theft, the very crime of which the 
defendant was charged in the instant case. 
Defense counsel objected to the questions and to the 
entire line of questioning (T 159) but his objections were over-
ruled as was his motion to strike (T 167). The error was 
compounded by the introduction of Exhibit 34, 35, 36, 37, 39 and 
40. 
These exhibits consisted of checks which the defendant 
was alleged to have taken and deposited to his own account and 
deposit slips which clearly had no material relation, to the 
allegations of the crime defendant was charged with in the 
present case. 
-10-
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This Court has considered the question of whether a 
defendant may be questioned concerning a crime or wrong of which 
he has not been convicted on several occasions. In State v Dixon 
12 U 2d 8, 361 P 2d 412 (1961) the defendant, on trial for robbery 
was questioned concerning a criminal incident in which the defendant 
had been involved but not convicted. The Court found the bounds 
of cross examination to have been exceeded and the incident to be 
immaterial to the natter before the Court. 
In State v Kazda, 14 U 2d 266, 382 P 2d 407 (1963) 
this Court held that testimony given by a Statefs witness concerning 
questioning of defendant by the witness in regard to various crimes 
the commission of which defendant had denied was prejudicial. At. 
382 P 2d 409, the Court stated: 
We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial 
error. It implied that the defendant was 
implicated in other crimes, none of them proven, 
and could have no other effect than to degrade 
the defendant and give the jury the impression 
that he had a propensity for crime. 
In the present case, the defendant was not only 
questioned concerning other crimes, but the prosecutor proceeded 
to offer evidence and testimony concerning those crimes although 
the defendant had not been convicted nor even charged with the 
commission of those crimes. The defendant was put in the 
position of either having to invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination before the jury or attempt to explain or deny the 
commission before the jury, either of which would undoubtedly 
prejudice the jury. 
A similar result was reached by the Court in State 
v Peterson, 23 U 2d 58, 457 P 2d 532 (1969) where the defendant 
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was charged with the sale of LSD and the Court found questions 
of the prosecutor of the defendant concerning his use of marijuana, 
itself a crime, to be prejudicial. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55, prohibits the use 
of evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion to prove his disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong on another specified occasion except to prove a 
material fact such as absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
In the instant case, none of the above exceptions allowing thi 
admission of such evidence is met. The clear objective of ttie 
prosecutor in questioning the defendant concerning prior crimes 
was to discredit his testimony and to degrade the defendant. A 
considerable portion of the trial was concerned with the uncharged 
and unproven allegations. The prosecutor also spent a considerable 
amount of time during his summation drawing the attention of the 
jurors to the uncharged incidents. The jury had the exhibits 
relating to those matters with them for their perusal during 
their deliberations. It is difficult to imagine how the jury 
could fairly deliberate upon the relevant issues concerning the 
offense with which appellant was charged. 
Had the appellant been previously convicted of theft 
in each of those previous transactions, the prosecutor would have 
be£n iimitld to simply inquiring as to whether or not appellant 
had been convicted and could not have gone into each incident to 
fe.K§ |f|ll extent and detail as he was allowed in this case. 
therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial 
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error in allowing inquiry and evidence relating to acts of which 
the appellant had not been convicted. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Annotated 76-1-202 (iii) violates the 
right to trial in the county wherein the crime is committed as 
guaranteed by Article I, section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
since it allows prosecution in a county other than the one in 
which the crime is committed. Appellant was therefore improperly 
tried in Utah County. 
Under the information as charged, the State failed to 
prove that appellant committed a crime in Utah County as is the 
burden of the State in a criminal case. 
The appellant was denied a fair trial by the inquiry 
of the prosecutor into prior instances of illegal activity on the 
part of defendant of which he had not yet been convicted and 
further by the introduction of evidence concerning those uncharged 
acts. 
Wherefore, the conviction of appellant herein should 
be reversed. 
DATED this ^ / day of July, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
Utah County Legal Defender Association, Inc. 
107 E. 100 S. 
Provo, UT 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
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